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Construing the Outer Limits of Sentencing Authority: 
A Proposed Bright-Line Rule for Noncapital 
Proportionality Review 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution declares that 
“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”1 The plain intent of 
this provision is to secure for individuals convicted of crimes a 
measure of protection from the government authority imposing 
punishment upon them. However, distinguishing which 
punishments are “cruel and unusual” from those that are not is 
sometimes a difficult task. Unfortunately, the language of the 
Amendment offers little guidance on whether a particular 
punishment is constitutionally precluded. Nonetheless, the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area has indicated that at least a basic 
feature of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is that 
punishments should, in some relative sense, be proportionate to the 
crimes committed.2 In other words, punishment should not be 
significantly more severe than the seriousness of the offense 
committed.3  
Although the Court has formulated substantive rules to guide 
proportionality review in the context of capital crimes,4 the Court’s 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This Amendment became applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1962. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–
67 (1962). 
 2. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of 
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”). 
 3. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1983) (“Although the precise scope of [the 
Eigth Amendment] is uncertain, it at least incorporated  ‘longstanding principle of English law 
that the punishment . . . should not be, by reason of its excessive length or severity, greatly 
disproportionate to the offense charged.’” (quoting RICHARD L. PERRY, SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES 236 (1959))). 
 4. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (prohibiting the imposition of 
the death penalty for non-homicidal crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for convicts under eighteen years of age); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for 
offenders with low intellectual capacity); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–96 (1977) 
(prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
568 
jurisprudence in the noncapital-crimes context has been vague, 
inconsistent, and difficult to apply. This is because in applying 
proportionality review to the length of prison terms, the Court has 
been unable to articulate any bright-line rules.5 As a result of the 
absence of concrete rules,6 and perhaps as a contributing factor to it, 
the Supreme Court has given significant deference to Congress and 
state legislatures in determining the constitutionality of their own 
sentencing legislation. This deference has amounted to an almost 
unbridled discretion that renders the Eighth Amendment 
meaningless in the noncapital crimes context.7 Consequently, both 
Congress and state legislatures have mandated increasingly severe 
sentencing requirements for criminal offenders,8 whether first-time 
or recidivist.9 One particular statute of this kind, 21 U.S.C. § 841, 
requires that individuals convicted under the statute who have 
already been convicted of two previous drug felonies must serve a 






 5. Recently, however, the Court articulated one rule for prison sentence 
proportionality. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole for 
a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide). 
 6. Justice Stevens argues that, despite the absence of bright-line rules in the noncapital 
context, such an absence “does not disable judges from exercising their discretion in 
construing the outer limits on sentencing authority that the Eighth Amendment imposes.” 
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 33 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 7. James J. Brennan, The Supreme Court’s Excessive Deference to Legislative Bodies 
Under Eighth Amendment Sentencing Review, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 551, 552 
(2004). 
 8. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(b) (2006) (mandating a life sentence without parole for 
drug offenders with two previous felony drug convictions); Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15–16 
(discussing California’s “three strikes” law imposing a mandatory minimum of twenty-five 
years for repeat offenders); Arizona v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378, 379–80 (2006) (discussing the 
Arizona legislature’s statutory scheme mandating a 200-year prison sentence for a defendant 
convicted of possessing twenty images of child pornography). 
 9. Recidivism is a term used to refer to repeated criminal conduct by the same 
offender. Thus, recidivist statutes aim to punish repeat offenders more harshly than one-time 
offenders for the same crimes as a method of deterring those individuals from even further 
criminal conduct. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (arguing that states have a 
legitimate interest in placing upon repeat offenders “the onus of one who is simply unable to 
bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the criminal law of the State”).  
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(b). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:50 PM 
567 Construing the Outer Limits of Sentencing Authority 
 569 
This Comment provides a review, analysis, and critique of the 
Court’s noncapital proportionality jurisprudence and proposes a 
bright-line rule that is specifically applicable to 21 U.S.C. § 841. 
Although the Court’s legal precedent in this field is far from 
uniform, much of the Court’s past language indicates that a bright-
line rule can be derived from existing case law. This Comment 
argues that imposing a life sentence without any possibility of parole 
for nonviolent11 criminal offenders is unconstitutionally 
disproportionate. Therefore, the rule proposed here would invalidate 
as unconstitutional the language in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) that 
mandates life imprisonment without an opportunity for parole for 
nonviolent repeat offenders. Overall, this rule would provide needed 
clarity to a body of law that—because it has little, if any, substantive 
criteria for courts to apply—is highly vulnerable to constitutional 
violations by politically motivated legislatures. 
Part II provides a foundational review of the Court’s precedent 
dealing with noncapital proportionality challenges. Part III examines 
the effects of the Court’s unsatisfactory approach by reviewing, as a 
case study, the Eight Circuit’s approach to 21 U.S.C. § 841. Part IV 
provides an analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence, primarily by 
demonstrating the Court’s consistent use of the principles that form 
the basis for the proposed bright-line rule. This Part also shows, 
however, why the authoritative rationale from Harmelin v. Michigan 
is highly problematic.12 Part V concludes by outlining the 
implications of the proposed rule for 21 U.S.C. § 841, as well as the 
likely benefits for noncapital proportionality jurisprudence. 
II. SUPREME COURT NONCAPITAL PROPORTIONALITY 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The current utility of the Court’s precedent in noncapital 
proportionality review is severely limited due to the lack of 
 
 11. The characteristic of “nonviolence” is used in this Comment so as to exclude any 
offense involving physical contact or abuse of another person. Therefore, sex crimes against 
others involving physical contact with the victim would not merit application of the proposed 
rule. However, defining exactly what conduct qualifies as “violent” is indeed a broad question, 
and not fully addressed here. The following discussion only deals with conduct that clearly 
qualifies as violent or threatening behavior.  
 12. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); see infra Part IV.C (demonstrating 
Justice Kennedy’s failure to adequately apply the critical principles). 
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substantive rules and clear principles.13 Lower courts have 
consequently had great difficulty engaging in meaningful analysis of 
noncapital proportionality challenges.14 However, the Court’s line of 
precedent in this field, if read carefully, provides support for the 
bright-line rule of prohibiting life imprisonment without parole for 
nonviolent offenses. This rule would substantially guide courts in 
determining the validity of many noncapital proportionality 
challenges, at least for cases implicating the serious penalty of life 
imprisonment. This Part therefore provides a brief foundational 
review of each of the Court’s major noncapital proportionality 
cases.15 
A. Weems v. United States 
The Court’s first twentieth-century case dealing with noncapital 
proportionality review was Weems v. United States.16 The Weems 
Court held that a fifteen-year prison sentence for the offense of 
falsifying a public document violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
proportionality principle.17 In that case, Weems was a disbursing 
officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and Transportation stationed in 
the Philippine Islands.18 While there, Weems had falsified a cash 
book by entering, as paid, wages for employees that had not actually 
been paid.19 Weems was consequently convicted of falsifying a public 
document,20 for which he was sentenced to a statutorily mandated 
fifteen years in prison.21 In addition to its length, the prison sentence 
was to be served “cadena temporal,” meaning that while Weems was 
 
 13. Most often, a factual comparison has been the only precedential value of the Court’s 
opinions, which are void of any clear principles. No clear, articulable doctrines have emerged 
other than in the context of juvenile offenders. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 
(2010). 
 14. See infra Part III.A. 
 15. While a serious analysis of these cases demonstrating how the proposed rule is 
grounded in the Court’s jurisprudence does not appear until Part IV, this Part provides a basic 
description of the Court’s treatment of noncapital proportionality review. 
 16. 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910). 
 17. Id. at 377 (holding that the punishment imposed was “cruel in its excess of 
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. . . . Its punishments 
come under the condemnation of the bill of rights.”). 
 18. Id. at 357. 
 19. Id. at 357–58. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Actually, the statute mandated only twelve years cadena temporal, but Weems was 
given a fifteen-year sentence by the court. Id. at 358, 364. 
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imprisoned, he would be chained at his ankles and wrists and forced 
to perform hard labor.22 The sentence also required that Weems be 
put on continuing supervision throughout his entire life.23 
Weems claimed on appeal that the length of his prison sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment for his rather minor 
offense.24 In analyzing the “cruel and unusual” nature of the 
sentence, the Court looked to the principle of proportionality as its 
primary analytical tool. The Court acknowledged that this principle, 
which stands for the proposition that “punishment for crime should 
be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,”25 clearly prohibits 
certain modes of punishment, such as torture. However, the Court 
also argued that the principle held broader meaning in that it 
prohibits any sentence that “is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and 
that which accompanies and follows imprisonment.”26 Thus, the 
Court argued that not only may a particular method of punishment 
violate the Eighth Amendment, but the excessive length of a prison 
term may violate it as well.27 Consequently, although Weems’s 
sentence was deemed unconstitutional for reasons independent of its 
length, the Court clearly stated that an excessive length of 
imprisonment may alone violate the Eighth Amendment. Therefore, 
in this case, the Court gave its first indication that proportionality 
review could be applied to a term of imprisonment.  
In determining that Weems’s sentence violated the Eighth 
Amendment,28 the Court reasoned that in addition to the nature of 
his imprisonment, the length of Weems’s prison term constituted an 
Eighth Amendment violation because it was disproportionately 
excessive to the severity of his crime.29 The Court came to this 
conclusion because Weems’s crime involved only a single wrong, 
 
 22. Id. at 364. There were some other restrictions as well, but these were less crucial to 
the Court’s analysis. Id. at 366. 
 23. Id. at 366. 
 24. Id. at 362. Interestingly, Weems did not raise his challenge based on the conditions 
of his imprisonment, but only upon the length of his sentence. Id. 
 25. Id. at 367. 
 26. Id. at 377 (emphasis added). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 382. 
 29. See id. at 377. Indeed, the Court stated that “[i]t is cruel in its excess of 
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. . . . Its punishments 
come under condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind.” Id. 
(emphasis added).  
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which had not actually harmed anyone.30 Additionally, the Court 
found that Weems’s sentence was disproportionately more severe 
than sentences imposed on others for more serious offenses, such as 
homicide, treason, inciting rebellion, and conspiracy to destroy the 
government by force.31  
Lastly, the Court noted that Weems’s sentence amounted to a 
“perpetual limitation of his liberty” because of the additional penalty 
of lifetime supervision.32 Together, these factors indicated that 
Weems’s sentence was excessively disproportionate to his crime and 
therefore constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
B. Rummel v. Estelle 
Next, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court upheld a life sentence with 
an opportunity for parole for a nonviolent recidivist offender.33 In 
that case, Rummel, having previously been convicted of two other 
nonviolent felonies, was convicted of fraudulent use of a credit 
card.34 Rummel received the sentence as a result of a Texas recidivist 
statute requiring that a mandatory life sentence35 with the possibility 
of parole be imposed for a third felony offense.36 
In upholding Rummel’s sentence, the Court again referred to 
the proportionality principle utilized in Weems, noting that “[t]his 
Court has on occasion stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime.”37 In referring to this principle, however, the 
Court stated that challenges to excessive noncapital sentences on 
proportionality grounds have only rarely succeeded.38  
 
 30. Id. at 365. 
 31. Id. at 380. 
 32. Id. at 366. 
 33. 445 U.S. 263, 280–81, 285 (1980). 
 34. Id. at 265–66. One of the prior felonies involved passing a forged check, and the 
other involved obtaining money by false pretenses. Id. 
 35. Id. at 266. 
 36. Id. at 268. 
 37. Id. at 271. 
 38. Id. at 272. In reality, the number of noncapital proportionality challenges that have 
been entertained by the Court has been quite small, which is likely the major reason why there 
have been few successful challenges. In fact, the entirety of the Court’s noncapital 
proportionality jurisprudence in the twentieth-century consists of only five cases. See Harmelin 
v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 
U.S. 370 (1982); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:50 PM 
567 Construing the Outer Limits of Sentencing Authority 
 573 
The Court then attempted to distinguish the case from Weems by 
arguing that Weems rested primarily on the nature of Weems’s 
imprisonment, rather than its excessive length.39 The Court argued 
this despite the language in Weems noting that the sentence was 
unconstitutional in its length and in its kind, and despite the fact 
that Weems himself had only challenged the constitutionality of the 
length of his term.40  
In upholding Rummel’s sentence, the Court gave substantial 
weight to the strong likelihood that, given the statute and longtime 
Texas sentencing customs, Rummel would very likely receive parole 
in only twelve years.41 Consequently, despite the fact that Rummel 
was formally sentenced to life in prison, the Court “could hardly 
ignore the possibility that he [would] not actually be imprisoned for 
the rest of his life.”42 
C. Solem v. Helm 
After Rummel, the Court invalidated a mandatory life sentence 
without the possibility of parole for a nonviolent recidivist offender, 
concluding that the sentence was “significantly disproportionate to 
[the] crime.”43 In that case, Helm, who had previously been 
convicted of six nonviolent felonies,44 was convicted of “uttering a 
‘no account’ check for $100.”45 As a result of his conviction, Helm 
was subjected to a South Dakota sentencing statute requiring that 
defendants convicted of a felony, if previously convicted of three or 
more felonies, be subject to life imprisonment without the possibility 
of parole.46  
 
 39. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273. The Rummel Court noted that the Weems decision was 
based on the totality of the circumstances; in Weems both the length of imprisonment and its 
accompanying punishment were potentially excessive. Id. 
 40. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362. 
 41. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280. In fact, Rummel was released on parole within eight 
months of the Court’s decision. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 n.25. 
 42. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 281. The Court then noted, “If nothing else, the possibility of 
parole, however slim, serves to distinguish Rummel from a person sentenced under a recidivist 
statute like Mississippi’s, which provides for a sentence of life without parole upon conviction 
of three felonies including at least one violent felony.” Id. This language indicates that the 
Court likely would have invalidated the Texas sentencing statute had there not been a 
possibility for parole, as in the Mississippi statute. 
 43. Solem, 463 U.S. at 303. 
 44. Id. at 279. 
 45. Id. at 281. 
 46. Id. at 281–82. 
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In assessing the proportionality of Helm’s sentence, the Court 
referred back to Weems, arguing that Weems had promulgated the 
principle that prison sentences could be unconstitutional merely 
because of excessive length.47 In supporting this proposition, the 
Court argued that the text of the Eighth Amendment, which 
expressly prohibits excessive fines and bail, makes no distinction 
between what kinds of punishments may violate the Amendment.48 
To the contrary, the Court noted that “[i]t would be anomalous 
indeed if the lesser punishment of a fine and the greater punishment 
of death were both subject to proportionality analysis, but the 
intermediate punishment of imprisonment were not.”49 
 In analyzing Helm’s sentence, however, the Court indicated the 
need for courts to look to objective factors in evaluating Eighth 
Amendment proportionality. It noted that courts should make an 
initial proportionality determination by comparing the “gravity of 
the offense [with] the harshness of the penalty.”50 While the Court 
recognized that this evaluation is inevitably subjective to some 
degree, it stated that courts are at least competent to measure the 
gravity of a crime “on a relative scale.”51 In demonstrating this 
competency, the Court provided an example, arguing that common 
perceptions justify the conclusion that “nonviolent crimes are less 
serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence.”52 
By using common-sense determinations of this kind, courts could 
ensure that less serious crimes would not be punished more severely 
than more serious crimes.53 After making this initial determination, 
the Court then noted that courts could compare the sentence in 
question with sentences of other crimes within the same 
jurisdiction.54 If more serious crimes were subject to the same or 
lesser penalty, then the sentence in question would likely be 
 
 47. See id. at 287. This claim contradicted the majority’s claim in Rummel, which 
argued that only certain modes of punishment may be reviewed under the proportionality 
principle. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 273. 
 48. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 290–91. 
 51. Id. at 292. 
 52. Id. at 292–93. The Court then stated that these examples “simply illustrate[] that 
there are generally accepted criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad 
scale.” Id. at 294. 
 53. Id. at 293. 
 54. Id. at 291. 
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unconstitutionally excessive.55 The Court also noted that it would be 
helpful for courts to compare the sentence in question to those 
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same offense.56  
In applying these factors, the Court found Helm’s sentence to be 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.57 First, the Court concluded 
that the offense involved was relatively unserious.58 While the 
majority acknowledged that states have a legitimate interest in 
punishing repeat offenders more harshly than first-time offenders, 
the Court reasoned that Helm’s crime was simply too minor to 
warrant the extreme penalty of life imprisonment without parole.59 
In categorizing Helm’s offense as unserious, the Court reasoned that 
not only was the amount of money taken an unsubstantial amount, 
but the offense did not involve violence or any threat of violence.60 
Additionally, none of Helm’s prior offenses involved violent or 
threatening conduct.61  
Second, in assessing the harshness of Helm’s penalty, the Court 
noted the great severity of Helm’s life sentence, even as opposed to 
the one imposed in Rummel since Helm’s term carried no possibility 
for parole. It was the possibility and strong likelihood of parole,62 the 
Court emphasized, which played such a significant influence in 
upholding the punishment in Rummel, and which served to 
distinguish that sentence from Helm’s.63 
Last, after finding an initial inference of disproportionality, the 
Court compared Helm’s sentence to more serious offenses in the 
same jurisdiction, as well as to those in other jurisdictions. In 
comparing Helm’s sentence to those imposed for more serious 
offenses, the Court noted that the only other crime mandating a life 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 303. 
 58. Id. at 296. 
 59. Id. at 296–97. 
 60. Id. at 296. 
 61. Id. at 296–97. This is an interesting conclusion, since Helm’s crimes included 
several third-degree burglaries, obtaining money under false pretenses, and grand larceny. Id. 
at 279–80. Obviously such crimes have victims, but the Court seemed to indicate that they 
were not considered “crimes against persons” because they were nonviolent, or rather, not 
physical crimes against persons. 
 62. In fact, the Rummel Court noted that the defendant would likely get parole in only 
twelve years. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280 (1980). 
 63. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297. 
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sentence was murder.64 However, first degree manslaughter, first 
degree arson, and kidnapping also required life imprisonment upon a 
second or third offense.65 Furthermore, in comparing Helm’s 
sentence to those in other jurisdictions, the Court found that no 
other state mandated a life sentence without parole for a repeat 
nonviolent crime.66 As a result of these findings, the Court 
concluded that Helm’s sentence was unconstitutionally 
disproportionate to his crime.67  
D. Harmelin v. Michigan 
Over a decade later, a plurality of the Court in Harmelin v. 
Michigan apparently diverged from the rationale in Solem by arguing 
that a mandatory life sentence without the possibility for parole was 
not unconstitutionally disproportionate for a single drug possession 
offense.68 While the Court was able to form a majority rationale for 
why individualized sentencing considerations were not required in 
the noncapital context,69 five Justices were unable to agree on why 
the defendant’s proportionality challenge failed. 
Joined by then-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia argued 
that no proportionality principle should apply outside the capital 
punishment context because the Founders did not intend it to.70 
Instead, he argued that proportionality only acted as a prohibition 
on certain modes of punishment, such as death or torture, rather 
 
 64. Id. at 298. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 299–300. While one other state would have permitted a life sentence without 
parole in similar circumstances, the Court noted that there was no evidence that such a 
sentence had actually ever been applied by the state in that way. Id.  
 67. Id. at 303. 
 68. Compare 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), with id. at 1009 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (illustrating Scalia’s argument that no proportionality principle 
should apply in the noncapital context, and Kennedy’s contention that it should apply but was 
not violated in this case). 
 69. Id. at 996 (majority opinion). 
 70. See id. at 994 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). Scalia’s argument about the original 
intent of the Founders in applying proportionality in the noncapital context is not without 
controversy however. A majority of the Court previously adopted the opposing interpretation, 
arguing instead that the adoption of the language from the English Bill of Rights in the Eighth 
Amendment implied an adoption of the English practice of applying proportionality review in 
the context of prison terms. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 285–86. Additionally, Solem noted the 
anomalous result of Scalia’s position in that it would require proportionality review for the 
lesser punishment of a fine and for the greater punishment of death, but not for the 
intermediate punishment of imprisonment. Id. at 289.  
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than on excessive lengths of already-accepted punishments, such as 
imprisonment.71 As a result, he dismissed Harmelin’s proportionality 
challenge outright, implying that a state may impose almost any 
prison term for any crime.72 
Scalia’s opinion, however, was not authoritative. As the Court 
stated in Marks v. United States, “[w]hen a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the 
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the 
judgments on the narrowest grounds.”73 As a result, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence became the authoritative rationale from 
Harmelin.  
Rather than arguing for a wholesale abandonment of 
proportionality review for prison terms, Kennedy argued that 
Harmelin’s sentence was simply not unconstitutionally 
disproportionate.74 In arriving at this conclusion, Kennedy addressed 
Scalia’s claims by arguing that, regardless of the original intention of 
the Founders, stare decisis warranted the Court’s continued 
acknowledgment of a narrow proportionality principle for noncapital 
sentences.75 Kennedy thus conceded that application of 
proportionality review in the noncapital context had previously been 
very difficult because “its precise contours are unclear.”76 
Furthermore, he explained, “our decisions recognize that we lack 
clear objective standards to distinguish between sentences for 
different terms of years.”77  
Despite this, Kennedy argued that there are common principles 
that can inform a court’s determination of prison sentence 
proportionality.78 First, “substantial deference” should be given to a 
 
 71. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 72. Scalia’s objection to noncapital proportionality review is not entirely absolute. Even 
he qualifies his objection for the “extreme” case, such as where a state imposes life 
imprisonment for overtime parking. Id. at 962. Consequently, Scalia’s argument altogether 
dismissing Harmelin’s challenge seems to obscure the critical question of whether it constitutes 
an “extreme” case. 
 73. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 74. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 75. Id. at 996–97. 
 76. Id. at 998. 
 77. Id. at 1000. 
 78. Id. Notably, Kennedy seemed to push the factors listed in Solem to the background 
of his analysis, choosing instead to formulate an approach that was extreme in its deference to 
legislatures. 
DO NOT DELETE 5/3/2011 1:50 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
578 
legislature’s choice of sentence, because formulating and assigning 
criminal sanctions is the province of the legislature.79 Second, 
Kennedy noted that the Constitution does not require adherence to 
any particular penological theory.80 Third, Kennedy argued that the 
differences in penological theories are an inevitable result of 
federalism, leading to the result that various states will undoubtedly 
impose unequal sentences for similar crimes.81 Last, Kennedy stated 
that proportionality review should be informed by objective factors.82 
Together, these considerations work to inform the overarching 
principle that only “gross disproportionality” between crime and 
punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.83  
Applying these principles to Harmelin’s sentence, Kennedy 
concluded that the defendant’s term was not grossly 
disproportionate because his crime was so serious. In arriving at this 
assertion, Kennedy stated that drug possession and distribution 
constitutes “one of the greatest problems affecting the health and 
welfare of our population.”84 Most notably, Kennedy rejected as 
“false to the point of absurdity”85 Harmelin’s claim that his private 
drug possession was nonviolent and victimless. In rejecting this 
argument, Kennedy hypothesized about the many ways in which 
drug offenses could lead to violence against others. First, he argued 
that drug criminals may commit crimes against others as a result of 
the physiological effects of the drugs on the individual.86 Second, 
such criminals may victimize others in order to obtain money for the 
 
 79. Id. at 999. 
 80. Id. This statement was intended to indicate that the goals of incapacitation and 
deterrence are as valid as retribution. Therefore, Kennedy argues that harsher sentences, which 
tend to serve deterrence and incapacitation values at the expense of retributive principles of 
justice, are nonetheless valid. However, this point tends to obscure the critical issue, since 
certainly Kennedy’s point is not true in all circumstances. This is because the Eighth 
Amendment’s purpose is to act as a prohibition on at least some punishments that might be 
imposed by a legislature. In other words, the mere use or application of proportionality review 
in the noncapital context illustrates that there are at least some instances in which harsh 
sentences, legitimately serving deterrence and incapacitation values, will nonetheless violate the 
Eighth Amendment because they are grossly disproportionate to the offense committed. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 1000. 
 83. Id. at 1001. 
 84. Id. at 1002 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 
(1989)). 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
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drugs, even to the point of committing violent acts.87 Last, Kennedy 
noted statistical correlations between drug offenders and other 
crimes.88 All of these arguments, combined with the heavy deference 
given to legislative judgments, worked to support the conclusions 
that Harmelin’s one-time offense of drug possession was serious 
enough to warrant a life sentence without parole, and that the 
sentence was not grossly disproportionate.89 
E. Ewing v. California and Lockyer v. Andrade 
In March 2003, the Court decided two noncapital 
proportionality cases that, although not involving mandatory life 
sentences without parole, further illustrated the Court’s unclear and 
inconsistent approach to noncapital proportionality review. In 
Ewing, the Court upheld a prison term of twenty-five years to life for 
a recidivist offender convicted of one count of felony grand theft of 
personal property in excess of $400.90 Ewing, who had a long history 
of mostly nonviolent crimes,91 had stolen three golf clubs priced at 
$399 each from a golf pro shop.92 As a result of his prior criminal 
history, California charged him under its three-strikes law, which 
stated that recidivist offenders already having two or more “serious” 
or “violent” felonies could receive an indeterminate term of life 
imprisonment with an opportunity for parole.93  
In upholding the constitutionality of Ewing’s sentence, the 
Court referred back to the rationale of Rummel, which had upheld a 
life sentence with the possibility of parole for a recidivist offender.94 
The Court reiterated the observation that a “recidivism statute ‘is 
nothing more than a societal decision that when such a person 
commits yet another felony, he should be subjected to the  
 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. at 1003. 
 89. Because no initial inference of gross disproportionality was found, the Court did not 
proceed to compare the sentence in question to those imposed in other jurisdictions or for 
other crimes. This was because Kennedy argued that such comparisons, utilized in Solem, are 
only required when an initial inference of gross disproportionality arises. Id. at 1004–05. 
 90. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003). 
 91. The Court recounted that, although most of the past crimes were nonviolent, there 
were a few incidents in which Ewing’s crimes involved violent or threatening conduct. Id. at 
18–19. 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. at 16. 
 94. Id. at 21. 
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admittedly serious penalty of incarceration for life, subject only to 
the State’s judgment as to whether to grant him parole.’”95  
In addition, however, the Court analyzed the sentence by 
looking to the critical factor emphasized in Rummel and Solem—the 
possibility of parole96—in conjunction with Kennedy’s “common 
principles” from Harmelin.97 In weighing the initial proportionality 
of the crime, the Court considered the gravity of Ewing’s offense 
compared to the harshness of his penalty.98 In performing this 
comparison, however, the Court noted that it would consider not 
only the nature of his triggering offense, but also of Ewing’s past 
offenses as well—some of which were violent in nature.99 As a result 
of weighing all of Ewing’s crimes, the Court asserted, without 
explanation, that Ewing’s sentence was “not ‘the rare case in which a 
threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence 
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’”100  
In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court similarly upheld a sentence of 
two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life, with the possibility 
of parole, for a recidivist offender punished under California’s three-
strikes law.101 Andrade was convicted of two counts of petty theft102 
after previously being convicted of three counts of first-degree 
residential burglary.103 As a result of the previous convictions, 
Andrade was sentenced to twenty-five years to life for each of his 
 
 95. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 278 (1980)). 
 96. See id. at 22 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983)). 
 97. Id. at 23–24 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
 98. Id. at 28. 
 99. See id. at 29. The Court noted in its initial description of Ewing’s burglary and 
robbery offenses that some violent interactions had taken place between Ewing and others. 
This resulted in the Court’s consideration of Ewing’s crimes as violent. See id. at 18–19. 
 100. Id. at 30 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). The 
Court failed to explicitly detail why it concluded that Ewing’s crime was serious enough to 
warrant the sentence he received, but the Court’s consideration of his past crimes, in addition 
to his triggering one, might indicate that the violent nature of some of his crimes was highly 
relevant to upholding his harsh sentence. This inference exists because the Court made a visible 
effort to explicitly describe the violent and threatening nature of some of his crimes. See id. at 
18–19. 
 101. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). 
 102. Andrade engaged in theft from two Kmart stores and absconded with roughly $150 
worth of videotapes. Id. at 66. 
 103. Id. at 68. Andrade was also previously convicted twice for misdemeanor theft, twice 
for transportation of marijuana, and once for escape from federal prison. Id. at 66–67. 
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counts, but was given the possibility of parole.104 In applying its 
“gross disproportionality” analysis, the Court relied primarily on a 
comparison of the facts to those in Rummel and Solem.105 The Court 
noted that Andrade’s sentence, like Rummel’s, held open a 
possibility for parole. Consequently, the Court did not find 
Andrade’s sentence inconsistent with Rummel or Solem, and it held 
that the punishment was not “grossly disproportionate” to the 
crime.106 
Since Ewing and Lockyer, the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
proportionality cases have primarily involved capital sentences in 
which the Court has relied on its separate death penalty 
jurisprudence.107 As a result, the Court’s approach to proportionality 
in the noncapital context has remained substantially the same since 
Ewing and Lockyer, relying only on vague rationales that lack any 
bright-line rules to help courts determine when a particular sentence 
violates the Eighth Amendment.  
III. EFFECTS OF THE COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE: 21 U.S.C. § 841 
As a result of the Court’s vague and sometimes inconsistent 
approach to proportionality review in the noncapital context, lower 
courts have granted heavy deference to legislatures in their 
determinations about the constitutionality of noncapital criminal 
penalties.108 Indeed, as Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin 
implied, the Court’s decisions in these cases have often been 
influenced by a near-absolute presumption of validity—in practice, if 
not in theory.109 This deference has essentially resulted in courts 
bypassing any meaningful constitutional analysis for challenged 
sentencing statutes. Consequently, some rather questionable 
sentencing statutes have been widely implemented by Congress and 
state legislatures.  
 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 74. 
 106. Id. at 77. 
 107. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 108. Brennan, supra note 7, at 552. 
 109. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (explaining the various principles of legislative deference that should inform a 
court’s proportionality review). 
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One such statute is 21 U.S.C § 841, which makes it unlawful for 
anyone to knowingly or intentionally possess, with intent to 
distribute, a controlled substance of a specified amount.110 The 
statute indicates that “[i]f any person commits a violation of this 
subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony 
drug offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a 
mandatory term of life imprisonment without release . . . .”111 The 
statute further requires that “[n]o person sentenced under this 
subparagraph shall be eligible for parole during the term of 
imprisonment imposed therein.”112 This statute therefore punishes 
individuals convicted of repeated but nonviolent drug activity with a 
mandatory life sentence with no possibility of parole, the most severe 
prison sentence possible. 
A. Eighth Circuit Cases Reviewing Proportionality of 21 U.S.C. § 841  
Because of the Harmelin Court’s deferential approach toward 
legislative determinations, proportionality review of 21 U.S.C. § 841 
has been meager at best. The Eighth Circuit’s precedent reviewing 
the proportionality of this statute is particularly illustrative of this 
trend.  
In 2003, the Eighth Circuit first addressed proportionality of the 
life sentence provision of 21 U.S.C § 841 in United States v. Collins.  
In Collins, the court held that the mandatory life term was 
constitutional. The court reasoned that a comparison of the statute 
to the facts in Harmelin, in which the Supreme Court upheld a life 
sentence without parole for a one-time conviction of cocaine 
possession, indicates that the statute must be valid.113 Furthermore, 
the court highlighted the significant deference given to legislatures in 
punishing drug offenses, noting that “such a sentence that falls 
within the range prescribed by statute has never been found to be an 
Eighth Amendment violation.”114 In stating this, the court appeared 
to argue that as long as a sentence is authorized by statute, no 
constitutional violation likely occurs. As a result, the court did not 
find any threshold inference of gross disproportionality between the 
 
 110. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). 
 111. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 112. Id. 
 113. United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 679 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 114. Id. at 680. 
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crime and sentence, leading to a dismissal of the defendant’s 
proportionality challenge.115 
In United States v. Scott, the Eighth Circuit again failed to take 
seriously the defendant’s claim that the statute was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate.116 In Scott, the defendant, after 
having had two prior felony drug possession convictions as a minor, 
was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison with no 
possibility of parole following his violation of the statute.117 Scott was 
found guilty of “conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of 
crack cocaine,”118 after which the government showed that Scott had 
been convicted of possessing heroin at sixteen years of age and 
possessing crack cocaine a year afterward. Because of the 
requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), Scott was sentenced to a 
mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.119 
In addressing Scott’s proportionality challenge to the sentence, 
the court dismissed his claim by merely referring to the circuit’s 
precedent foreclosing findings that the statute was grossly 
disproportionate.120 In this, the court again relied on Harmelin, 
arguing that “[p]ossession, use and distribution of illegal drugs 
represent ‘one of the greatest problems affecting the health and 
welfare of our population’ . . . . [The defendant’s] crime threatened 
to cause grave harm to society.”121 Consequently, the court stated in 
conclusory fashion—without analysis or explanation—that Scott’s 
sentence was not one in which an inference of gross 
disproportionality between crime and sentence existed.122  
 
 115. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 986 (8th Cir. 2008) (offering 
only a brief paragraph analyzing the proportionality of 21 U.S.C. § 841, with the court making 
the conclusory assertion that, despite the trial court’s reservations about the excessiveness of 
the sentence, its precedent forecloses any proportionality challenge to the statute); United 
States v. Whiting, 528 F.3d 595, 597 (8th Cir. 2008) (relying only on the facts of Harmelin 
to uphold its own determination that the life sentence imposed in 21 U.S.C. § 841 was not 
grossly disproportionate); United States v. Whitehead, 487 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (8th Cir. 
2007) (offering only a conclusory assertion that the life sentence for repeat drug offenders does 
not lead to an inference of gross disproportionality). 
 116. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1018 (2010). The court devoted merely one 
short paragraph of its eight-page opinion to a proportionality analysis of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1012. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1012–13. 
 120. Id. at 1018. 
 121. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)). 
 122. Id. at 1018. 
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Though few, these cases are prime examples of how lower courts 
have dealt with the Supreme Court’s vague line of jurisprudence for 
noncapital proportionality review. Due to the Supreme Court’s lack 
of clear rules or principled criteria in noncapital proportionality 
review, lower courts are prompted to engage in little or no analysis as 
to why a particular statutory sentence does not lead to an inference 
of gross disproportionality. Instead, the most that can be gleaned 
from the Court’s precedents are the mere facts. Most worrisome, 
unjust outcomes are more likely to result as politically pressured 
legislatures attempt to formulate increasingly harsh sentences, 
perhaps at the expense of constitutionally prescribed protections. 
IV. UTILIZING THE COURT’S PRECEDENT: FORMULATING A 
BRIGHT-LINE RULE  
In the face of the Court’s vague approach, this Comment argues 
that a bright-line rule can and should be extracted from the Court’s 
noncapital proportionality precedents. This rule would not only 
provide lower courts with substantive principles to work from in 
evaluating the constitutionality of particular sentences, but it may 
also better serve conceptions of justice and retribution by preventing 
less serious crimes from being punished significantly more severely 
than more serious crimes.  
This rule would dictate that nonviolent crimes, because they are 
less serious than violent crimes, should not be punished with the 
extreme penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole, even for repeat nonviolent offenders. While such recidivist 
offenders are no doubt legitimately subject to harsher sentences than 
first-time offenders, the Court’s jurisprudence supports the assertion 
that a limit to such penalties should preclude life imprisonment 
without parole. 
A. Nonviolent Offenses 
Throughout the Court’s noncapital proportionality 
jurisprudence, one common thread that emerges from the Court’s 
rationale is that nonviolent crimes are inherently less serious than 
violent crimes. Therefore, nonviolent crimes should not be punished 
with criminal law’s most severe noncapital sentence. In other words, 
because nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent crimes, it 
violates the Eighth Amendment to punish such offenses with the 
law’s harshest prison sentence. As indicated previously, the Court 
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utilizes this principle in all of the cases previously reviewed, although  
Harmelin’s approach to this principle is highly problematic.123   
First, the Weems Court impliedly relied on the assertion that 
Weems’s sentence was excessively harsh because his crime was 
nonviolent and victimless.124 The Court noted that the fifteen-year 
prison sentence was imposed merely for “‘perverting the truth’ in a 
single item of a public record,” despite the fact that “there [was] no 
one injured.”125 Consequently, the Court recognized that Weems’s 
crime was not as serious as one would expect it to be to be punished 
with such a harsh penalty. In recognizing this, the Court relied on 
the premise that nobody was physically injured or even threatened, 
impliedly acknowledging that because Weems’s crime was 
nonviolent, he should not have been punished so severely.126 
Additionally, the Court compared Weems’s offense to other 
crimes considered to be more serious, including certain degrees of 
homicide, “treason, inciting rebellion, conspiracy to destroy the 
Government by force, [and] recruiting soldiers in the United States 
to fight against the United States,” all of which are violent in 
nature.127 In comparing Weems’s crime to these violent offenses, the 
Court again impliedly acknowledged that Weems’s crime was less 
serious because it was nonviolent. 
Second, while the Rummel Court rejected the defendant’s claim 
that his life sentence was disproportionate because his offense was 
nonviolent, it did so with the understanding that the defendant’s 
sentence included the possibility for parole.128 As a result, it indicated 
that while nonviolent crimes may nonetheless warrant substantial 
penalties,129 it would likely be unwilling to impose a life term without 
 
 123. See infra Part IV.C. 
 124. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910). 
 125. Id. at 365. 
 126. While it could be argued that the Court’s focus on a lack of injury was intended to 
refer to nonphysical injury or loss as well as to physical injury, the Court’s later comparison of 
Weems’s crime to violent crimes lends support to the inference that the lack of physical injury 
to anyone was the critical consideration. See id. at 380. 
 127. Id. The Court also lists several nonviolent crimes, but seemingly only to show that 
such crimes, similar to Weems’s crime, were not punished so severely, and therefore indicate 
an inference of disproportionality. “The offense described has similarity to the offense for 
which Weems was convicted, but the punishment provided for it is in great contrast to 
[Weems’s sentence] . . . .” Id. 
 128. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 280–81 (1980). 
 129. Id. at 275 (arguing that the absence of violence “does not always affect the strength 
of society’s interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal”). 
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parole for the nonviolent recidivist offender.130 Indeed, the Court 
repeatedly referred to the strong likelihood of parole as a major 
factor that influenced its upholding of Rummel’s sentence.131 
Consequently, the Court once again impliedly recognized that 
nonviolent recidivist crimes are at least not serious enough to be 
punished with the extreme sentence of life imprisonment without 
parole. 
Third, in Solem v. Helm, the Court explicitly drew upon the 
claim that nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent crimes. The 
Solem Court held that the defendant’s life sentence without parole 
was unconstitutionally disproportionate because it was imposed for a 
nonviolent crime.132 In articulating its three-pronged analysis, the 
Court referred to this “nonviolence” factor while demonstrating the 
requirement that courts judge the “gravity” of an offense on a 
relative scale.133 In that demonstration, the Court stated that 
commonly shared beliefs support the notion that “nonviolent crimes 
are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of 
violence.”134 In applying this to Helm’s circumstances, the Court 
concluded that the crime of passing a forged check was “‘one of the 
most passive felonies a person could commit,’”135 not only because 
of the amount taken, but because “[i]t involved neither violence nor 
threat of violence to any person.”136 Additionally, the Court noted 
that relevant to the analysis was the fact that while Helm was a repeat 
offender, all of his crimes were nonviolent.137 As a result, in holding 
Helm’s sentence unconstitutional, the Court expressly confirmed the 
proposition that nonviolent crimes are less serious than violent ones 
and should therefore not be punished with a life sentence without 
parole, even for repeated offenses.138 
 
 130. See id. at 280. 
 131. Id. at 280–81. 
 132. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).  
 133. Id. at 290–91. 
 134. Id. at 292–93. Interestingly, the Court also included a reference to the general 
policy that the criminal law aims to protect the physical well-being of people more than 
property. Id. at 293. 
 135. Id. at 296 (quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson, 
J., dissenting)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 296–97. 
 138. In its analysis comparing Helm’s offense to other crimes, the Court did imply that 
“a third offense of heroin dealing” constituted a more serious crime, even though it was 
nonviolent. Id. at 299. However, in referring to that offense, the Court merely seemed to 
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Last, while Ewing and Lockyer did not deal explicitly with the 
“nonviolence” principle, the Ewing Court did implicitly utilize that 
distinction in its analysis.139 In that case, while weighing the gravity 
of the crime against the harshness of the sentence, the Court 
considered not only the defendant’s nonviolent triggering crime, but 
also his past crimes, some of which were violent.140 Indeed, the 
Court made a point to include the violent or threatening nature of 
some of Ewing’s past crimes in its recitation of the facts.141 In 
recognizing the violent nature of those crimes, the Court upheld the 
defendant’s sentence because it recognized that Ewing’s crimes, 
some of which were violent, were deserving of especially harsh 
penalties. Consequently, the Court impliedly recognized that 
because at least some of Ewing’s crimes were violent, Ewing was 
more deserving of particularly severe punishment. 
Overall, although the Court has weighed the gravity of offenses 
somewhat differently throughout its cases (which, perhaps, is 
explained by the differing ideologies of the Justices who formed the 
majorities in those cases), the fundamental distinction of whether an 
offense is nonviolent or violent has constituted a significant factor, if 
not the most significant factor, in the Court’s assessment of the 
gravity of crimes. With the exception of Harmelin (which will be 
addressed below),142 even in the cases where the Court upheld the 
challenged sentences, the Court was unwilling to state that 
nonviolent offenses could be subject to a life term without parole. 
B. Exclusion of the Possibility of Parole 
Another common thread evident throughout the Court’s 
precedent has been the suspect nature of life sentences that carry no 
possibility of parole. Thus, while the previous Section noted the less 
serious nature of nonviolent offenses, this Section emphasizes the 
 
argue that such a crime was more serious than the defendant’s, but was punished less severely. 
See id. The Court did not actually indicate whether it would have upheld a life term without 
parole for a third offense of heroin dealing. 
 139. Like Rummel, Ewing argues that some nonviolent crimes may be considered 
serious, but the case’s analytic approach is less relevant because it does not deal directly with a 
life sentence without parole, or an offender whose triggering or previous offense did not 
involve violence. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 18–19. 
 142. See infra Part IV.C. 
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more suspect nature of life sentences without parole. Indeed, in 
Weems, Rummel, and Solem, this factor was highly relevant to the 
holdings that the nonviolent offenses in question could or could not 
be punished with life imprisonment. 
First, the Weems Court demonstrated an increased level of 
concern for sentences whose penalties are imposed for a life term. 
While that case did not deal with a term of life imprisonment, one of 
the factors that the Court considered relevant to its decision was that 
the sentence called for lifetime probation.143 After reviewing the 
nature and length of the defendant’s term of imprisonment, the 
Court also noted the excessive length of his probation, stating that 
“[h]is prison bars and chains are removed, it is true, after twelve 
years, but he goes from them to a perpetual limitation of his liberty. 
He is . . . forever kept within voice and view of the criminal 
magistrate . . . .”144 Consequently, relevant to the Court’s analysis 
was the assumption that sentences mandating lifelong punishment 
are more constitutionally suspect under the Eighth Amendment than 
other sentences. 
Second, the Rummel Court repeatedly expressed, as critical to its 
holding, the fact that the defendant’s sentence in that case was 
constitutional because it carried the possibility of parole.145 In 
addressing the defendant’s challenges to the sentence, the Court 
stated that “Rummel could hardly ignore the possibility that he will 
not actually be imprisoned for the rest of his life.”146 Additionally, 
the Court distinguished a life term with the possibility of parole from 
life terms not carrying a chance for parole, impliedly indicating that 
the latter sentence, if imposed in a similar context, might be 
unconstitutional.147 The Court also recognized that Rummel’s 
possibility for parole was substantial in that, given Texas parole 
customs, Rummel had a strong likelihood of receiving parole.148 
Thus, the Court explicitly noted that the possibility of parole played  
a crucial part in its decision to uphold a life sentence for nonviolent 
 
 143. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910). 
 144. Id. at 366. 
 145. In fact, the defendant in Rummel was paroled after only eight months. See Solem v. 
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.25 (1983). 
 146. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281 (1980). 
 147. See id. (distinguishing Rummel’s sentence from a Mississippi statute requiring life 
imprisonment without parole). 
 148. Id. at 280–81. 
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conduct. 
Third, the Solem Court expressly argued that the possibility of 
parole constituted a crucial factor in its determination that a life 
sentence for repeated nonviolent offenses was unconstitutional. In 
analyzing the sentence, the Court argued that the sentence was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate, in part because “[the] sentence 
[wa]s far more severe than the life sentence we considered in 
Rummel v. Estelle” because Rummel had a strong likelihood of 
receiving parole.149 This fact, the Court argued, was one “on which 
the Court [in Rummel] relied heavily.”150 Consequently, the Court 
again reiterated the significant influence that the possibility of parole 
carried in evaluating the constitutionality of a life term imposed for 
nonviolent conduct. 
Last in Lockyer, the Court again argued that the possibility of 
parole played a critical role in approving a statute punishing 
nonviolent recidivist offenders with life imprisonment.151 
Additionally, while the Court in Ewing did not explicitly discuss the 
relevance of the possibility of parole in upholding Ewing’s sentence, 
it relied heavily on the facts and reasoning of Rummel,152 which 
indicated the substantial role that parole plays in proportionality 
review.153 Overall, the Court has continuously utilized the possibility 
of parole as a critical factor in determining the constitutionality of a 
life term for nonviolent offenses, whether recidivist or not. 
Additionally, the Court indicated in Rummel that the weight of this 
factor is most meaningful when there is a substantial likelihood that 
parole will be granted, rather than being offered as a mere formal 
possibility. 
C. Analyzing Harmelin v. Michigan 
Perhaps the clearest obstacle to the proposed rule, and the most 
inconsistent decision rendered in this line of jurisprudence, was the 
 
 149. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 74 (2003) (arguing that since Andrade 
retained the possibility of parole, the case was not “materially indistinguishable” from either 
Rummel or Solem). 
 152. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (relying on Rummel’s arguments 
justifying increased punishment for recidivist offenders). 
 153. Solem, 463 U.S. at 297 (illustrating Solem’s assessment that the possibility of parole 
played a substantial role in the Rummel decision). 
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Court’s decision in Harmelin. As previously stated,154 the Harmelin 
Court held that a life sentence without the possibility for parole did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment for a first-time offender 
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.155 However, the merit 
and authority of that decision is highly questionable for several 
important reasons. First, the decision was fractured because the 
Court was unable to form even a five-Justice majority as to why the 
defendant’s sentence was not grossly disproportionate.156 Second, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which is the authoritative rationale 
from the case, suggested a mode of analysis that unfortunately did 
nothing to actually inform courts about how to substantively apply 
proportionality review in specific cases. Third, and most significantly, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence blatantly misapplied principles from 
the Court’s earlier decisions, resulting in an erroneous outcome.  
1. Fractured decision 
First, the authority of Harmelin is questionable because no 
majority rationale existed as to the proportionality issue. While five 
Justices were able to agree regarding the individualized sentencing 
issue, there was not a majority rationale explaining why the 
defendant’s sentence was not unconstitutionally disproportionate. As 
previously noted,157 Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist argued 
that because the Eighth Amendment was not originally intended to 
apply to prison terms, the proportionality principle should not be 
applied at all.158 On the other hand, Justice Kennedy and two other 
Justices argued that proportionality review did apply in the 
noncapital context, but that Harmelin’s sentence did not violate that 
doctrine.159 While the fractured nature of a decision may not totally 
negate its authority, the lack of a majority rationale does serve to 
undermine its weight. 
 
 154. See supra Part II.D. 
 155. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1009 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 156. The decision was a plurality, with two Justices supporting Scalia’s position and three 
supporting Kennedy’s. Id. at 961, 996. 
 157. See supra Part II.D. 
 158. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 159. Id. at 1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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2. Kennedy’s emphasis on legislative deference obscures the critical issue 
Second, Kennedy’s authoritative concurrence obscured the 
critical issue in noncapital proportionality review. As noted 
previously,160 Kennedy’s first three “common principles” essentially 
all stand for the proposition that substantial deference should be 
given to legislatures in defining the severity of their sentencing 
schemes.161 Essentially, Kennedy argued that because few bright-line 
principles or rules exist from which a court can make a determination 
about the constitutionality of a particular sentence, practical 
considerations require that courts simply accept those sentences as 
constitutional. 
Unfortunately, while this approach is useful in reminding courts 
about the legislature’s role in formulating criminal sentences, it tends 
to obscure the critical issue. While it is no doubt the prerogative of 
state legislatures to formulate their own criminal sentencing schemes, 
the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court throughout the last 
century, requires that a prohibition on “‘grossly disproportionate’”162 
sentences be applied in the noncapital context. This requirement acts 
as a restriction on the outer limits of a legislature’s sentencing 
authority. As a result, while some level of deference to a legislative 
determination of punishment is desirable, the critical question in 
noncapital proportionality review is when the scope of that deference 
is exceeded, resulting in a grossly disproportionate sentence. Thus, 
because it is possible that in at least some instances a sentence will be 
grossly disproportionate to an offense, Kennedy’s general declaration 
informing courts that legislatures are entitled to deference does little 
to help courts understand when that deference should be set aside or 
when a particular sentence actually becomes grossly 
disproportionate. Consequently, Kennedy’s three principles granting 
deference to legislatures do little by themselves to inform courts as to 
how to apply proportionality review to prison terms. 
 
 
 160. See supra Part II.D. 
 161. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 162. Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)). 
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3. Kennedy erroneously measured the gravity of Harmelin’s drug 
offense 
Last, Kennedy’s application of the “objective factor” prong 
miscalculates the gravity of drug offenses generally, thus resulting in 
an erroneous outcome. This is partly because Kennedy’s “objective 
factor” analysis only required the Court to consider the threshold 
question of whether a given crime and sentence give rise to an 
inference of gross disproportionality.163 Unfortunately, Kennedy’s 
reasoning of this issue was substantially lacking. As noted 
previously,164 in deciding whether or not an inference of 
disproportionality exists, the Court looks to the “gravity of the 
offense” compared to the “harshness of the penalty.”165 Applying 
objective factors to this assessment, Harmelin’s sentence should have 
aroused increased suspicion from the Court because it was the most 
severe sentence possible for a noncapital crime. Because of the 
severity of such a sentence, an inference of gross disproportionality 
would necessarily arise unless Harmelin’s crime was itself equally 
serious. 
In assessing the gravity of the offense, Kennedy drew upon the 
nonviolent/violent crime distinction, as raised by the petitioner.166 
In his challenge, the defendant argued that his sentence was 
unconstitutionally disproportionate because his crime was nonviolent 
and victimless.167 In response to this, Kennedy stated that this claim 
was “false to the point of absurdity. To the contrary, petitioner’s 
crime threatened to cause grave harm to society.”168 In supporting 
this claim, Kennedy hypothesized about all the ways in which drug 
offenders, as a result of their drug-related conduct, could become 
involved in violent crimes against society,169 even identifying a 
statistical correlation between drug crimes and violent crimes.170 
Unfortunately, Kennedy’s reasoning relied merely on a hypothetical 
relationship of drugs to violence, instead of considering whether 
Harmelin himself had been involved in violent conduct. 
 
 163. Id. at 1005. 
 164. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
 165. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J. concurring). 
 166. Id. at 1002. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 1002–03. 
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Following Kennedy’s rationale to its logical end, any kind of 
crime could be considered a “violent” crime, even if nonviolent in 
reality. If the method for identifying a violent crime is to identify a 
probability that the particular crime will lead to subsequent violent 
behavior, then almost any illegal conduct could be considered 
violent, since committing any illegal act carries at least some 
increased likelihood that an individual may engage in violence or 
threatening behavior to avoid detection and punishment. As a result, 
Kennedy’s analysis could be said to result in the conclusion that all 
illegal behavior has, as part of its “culture,”171 the attribute of 
violence. 
Even more problematic is Kennedy’s assessment of the serious or 
violent nature of drug crimes, which was based upon a hypothetical 
possibility that a particular drug offender would engage in violent 
conduct instead of whether the sentence at issue actually involved 
violent conduct. As a result, Kennedy’s analysis ascribing violence to 
all drug crimes reaches too broadly. If a particular drug offender 
actually engages in violent behavior, then a particular sentence may 
take that conduct into account by increasing the severity of the 
sentence. However, to make a broad conclusory assertion attributing 
violence to all drug crimes, even when particular offenders never 
actually engaged in any violent conduct at all, is to paint too broad a 
stroke. In other words, Kennedy’s analysis should have looked only 
at Harmelin’s actual criminal conduct, which was nonviolent, rather 
than abstractly ascribing violence to it. 
As a result of this error, Kennedy’s concern about the violent 
nature of drug offenses results in an exaggeration of the gravity of 
those crimes because violent conduct constitutes a separate offense 
for which offenders may be charged. Consequently, Kennedy’s 
conclusion that Harmelin’s sentence did not carry an inference of 
gross disproportionality was highly suspect. Kennedy should have 
concluded that drug crimes alone, although more serious than many 
other nonviolent crimes, are generally less serious than violent crimes 
such as assault, rape, kidnapping, manslaughter, or murder. 
Furthermore, Kennedy’s conclusion that a mandatory life sentence 
without parole for a nonviolent drug offense does not give rise to an 
inference of gross disproportionality was erroneous. This is because 
 
 171. See id. at 1002 (“A violent crime may occur as part of the drug business or 
culture”). 
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such a conclusion permits nonviolent or less serious conduct to be 
punished with the law’s most severe noncapital punishment. 
Therefore, given the significant problems with the Court’s decision 
in Harmelin v. Michigan, the rule that Eighth Amendment 
proportionality prohibits the imposition of a life sentence without 
parole for nonviolent crimes should be accepted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
One obvious implication of the proposed bright-line rule would 
be invalidation of the mandatory life sentencing provision of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b) for repeat nonviolent offenders. However, some 
might find such a result objectionable, at least in the context of 
recidivist offenders, since legislatures have a strong interest in 
punishing repeat offenders more severely. Nevertheless, that interest 
cannot extend absolutely to the imposition of any penalty because 
the purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to act as an outer limit on 
the government’s sentencing authority. Thus, while government has 
a strong interest in punishing repeat offenders more severely, the 
Eighth Amendment does not allow legislatures to exercise absolute 
or unlimited discretion in punishing criminal offenders. Instead, the 
Eight Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments” was intended to act as a check on governmental 
authority and to secure a certain measure of protection for criminal 
defendants. 
Additionally, although legislatures are justified in punishing 
recidivism more harshly than non-recidivism, this fact does not 
negate the principle that nonviolent crimes are generally less serious 
than violent crimes. In other words, repeated nonviolent crimes are 
still nonviolent, and should therefore be punished less harshly than 
more serious, violent crimes. This bright-line rule would therefore 
not only act as a limit on legislative discretion, but it would also 
ensure proportionality between nonviolent and violent crimes while 
still allowing legislatures to impose harsh sentences upon recidivist 
offenders.172 Additionally, it should be noted that this rule would 
likely not prevent a legislature from imposing a life sentence without 
 
 172. Again, it is important to recognize that the proposed rule does not interfere with the 
broad sentencing authority of Congress or state legislatures, but acts only to impose an outer 
limit on that authority, which protects the general intent that the Eighth Amendment was 
intended to serve. 
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parole for a repeat offender whose triggering offense is nonviolent, 
but whose previous offenses include one or more violent crimes. 
Indeed, the approach that the Court has taken throughout its 
jurisprudence in this area indicates that past violent crimes are taken 
into consideration when determining whether a harsher sentence is 
permissible.173 Thus, repeat offenders whose triggering offense is 
nonviolent, but who have been convicted previously of a violent 
crime, might not benefit from the proposed rule. 
In all, the Court’s precedent supports the adoption of a bright-
line rule prohibiting nonviolent offenders from being sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Because the plain 
premise of proportionality is that less serious crimes should be 
punished less severely than more serious crimes, nonviolent crimes as 
a general class should not be punished as severely as violent crimes. 
Furthermore, adopting the bright-line rule distinguishing nonviolent 
from violent conduct would serve to highlight a concrete principle 
from the Court’s precedent, which would give both lower courts and 
lawmakers a clearer understanding of how to approach sentencing 















 173. In Ewing, the Court reasoned that recidivist statutes are based on the rational 
judgment that “offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to 
commit felonies must be incapacitated.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30 (2003). Thus, 
the Court did not qualify its use of those “who continue to commit felonies” with any 
requirement that the triggering felony be violent, resulting in the inclusion of the defendant’s 
past crimes in its proportionality analysis. 
  J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. 
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